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ENLIGHTENMENT AND SECULARISM. 
FOREWORD FROM THE GUEST EDITOR 
– Anna Tomaszewska –
In the broadly construed Western world, the advancement of secularism 
seems to have become a fact. According to intellectual historians and philoso-
phers, this fact has been brought about by a variety of factors and conditions, some 
of which can be traced back to the early modern era, and especially to the Enlight-
enment. The term “secularism,” though, which originates from the Latin saeculum, 
has a number of different meanings, used (and sometimes abused) both in the 
public discourse and philosophical literature. Politically, secularism means separa-
tion of religion from the institutions of public life, such that the laws established 
and enforced by these institutions do not have a theological grounding or do not 
express preference for particular religious doctrines.1 The separation of religion 
and political power may also imply that the state is obliged to guarantee and 
respect individuals’ right to confess and practice whatever creed they deem best 
suited to realize their striving for the (supernatural) good, but also their right to 
deny faith in any transcendent or supernatural reality, and act according to such 
convictions.  
Apart from the political understanding of secularism, there is also the un-
derstanding that takes into account the historical processes as well as philosophi-
cal and ideological developments that led to the situation in which the influence of 
religion on society and individuals’ lives would be challenged or even marginal-
ized.2 On this construal, living in a secular society means living in a society whose 
members do not consider religion an important value guiding their lives, or do not 
abide by the doctrines, principles, and traditions of any particular faith, even 
though they may occasionally consider themselves believers in a transcendent 
God or other supernatural reality.3 A secular society does not have to be one in 
1 Bhargava (2008, 2016). See also: Maclure and Taylor (2011), and Maclure (2017). 
2 In this culture-related sense, secularism has been characterized as the “falling off of religious be-
lief and practice.” Taylor (2007): 2. 
3 The latter phenomenon has been referred to as “believing without belonging.” See Davie (1994). 
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which everyone is atheist; rather, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, it is one in 
which being a consistent believer has become problematic.4 Without certain histor-
ical and philosophical developments – such as the Protestant Reformation, the 
17th-century wars of religion, the attempts at rationalizing revealed religion by 
radical reformers or enlighteners, the Enlightenment criticism of religious institu-
tions, pleas for religious toleration and freedom of thought and speech, and the 
French Revolution (to name but a few) – religion would most probably have 
a different role to play in our social imaginary nowadays. 
It should be emphasised, though, that secularism does not have to be con-
ceived of as inimical to religion. Within what Taylor has called an “immanent 
frame” – which provides a context for understanding human existence and social 
practice without relating them to a transcendent order5 – there is a possibility of an 
open perspective in which faith can play a due role in individuals’ lives. Still, this 
means that faith is one among many options in our culture nowadays, and the 
choice to stay in (a particular) faith requires justification. But, in political terms, 
secularism can as much as support religion in that it guarantees, apart from the 
separation of religious institutions and political power, freedom to exercise one’s 
beliefs, and protects freedom of conscience. In an essay written by Taylor together 
with Jocelyn Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, this kind of secularism 
– marked by the state’s readiness to grant accommodations to citizens whenever 
a conflict between convictions of conscience and legal requirements occurs – is 
called “pluralist liberal” and opposed to the “republican” kind of secularism aim-
ing at the relegation of religion from the public sphere.6  
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, secularism and religion may 
even go hand in hand: this can at least be the case, according to some authors, 
with Christianity – to the extent that certain values foundational for a secular and 
liberal state originate from it. In a sense, the Christian religion can be regarded as 
providing an ideological basis to a secular state, for example by promoting free 
will and moral choice, and the conception of human beings as individual persons;7 
or as encouraging the development towards secularism by allowing of the ration-
                                                 
4 This observation Taylor has encapsulated in the following question: “Why is it so hard to believe 
in God in (many milieux of) the modern West, while in 1500 it was virtually impossible not to?” 
Taylor (2007): 539.  
5 See ibidem: 543.  
6 For the distinction between the pluralist liberal and the republican kinds of secularism see Maclu-
re and Taylor (2011): 27. On the need for accommodations related to religious diversity and minori-
ties see also Nussbaum (2012).  
7 See, e.g., Siedentop (2014); Smith (2017); for a discussion of this view see Barnat (2017). 
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alization of its own moral doctrines: a process to which 18th-century thinkers, in-
cluding Immanuel Kant, have significantly contributed.8  
The articles collected in this special issue explore, in an original way, the in-
tricate relations between secularism, in the diverse meanings of the term, and En-
lightenment. This is not to say that the link between Enlightenment and secular-
ism is self-evident: some have argued that attributing a secularizing tendency to 
the intellectual developments witnessed in the “age of reason” is anachronistic 
and manifests an attempt to interpret history from the point of view of only 
one among many competitive philosophical-historical stances,9 and others have 
claimed that this tendency was characteristic of the “radical” as opposed to the 
“moderate” current of the Enlightenment thought.10 However, what seems rather 
undisputed is the fact that particularly in the Enlightenment religion, as well as 
the relations between the divine and the political, became one of the key problems 
widely debated by the intellectuals and leading thinkers of the era. This volume 
offers a closer look at some of these debates which continue to bear much rele-
vance to contemporary issues. 
Accordingly, Sorin Baiasu offers an argument in support of a limited ver-
sion of political secularism – understood in terms of the separation between reli-
gion and the state – that can be derived from the writings of Kant, by many schol-
ars considered a “founding father” of secularism. The argument is based on an 
epistemic distinction between political and religious claims, which states that we 
can have moral (practical) but not religious cognition. Whereas, on Kantian tenets, 
faith may rest at most on subjectively sufficient grounds, knowledge – also that 
which pertains to our moral obligations – requires objectively sufficient justifica-
tions. Since religious claims cannot be considered knowledge claims, they cannot 
be held universally true, and this, one can surmise, would open up a space for 
a plurality of different creeds within a political community, thus for religious plu-
ralism.  
Relatedly, Mehmet Ruhi Demiray discusses Kant’s model of the relations 
between law, ethics, and religion against a background of the debate on whether 
religion can provide reasons for political-legal norms, in which two approaches 
prevail: austere secularism, on the one hand, and integrationism, on the other. 
On the basis of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Demiray argues that, 
                                                 
8 On different aspects of rationalizing the Christian faith see, e.g., Jacob (2014); Krop (2017); Hunter 
(2005). 
9 This claim has been forcefully argued in Hunter (2015). 
10 See, e.g., Israel (2006). 
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on Kant’s position, both the separation between religion and the state and the pub-
lic significance of religion can be vindicated. Kant’s argument for secularism is 
based on his recognition of the differences between ethical and political communi-
ty: the authority of the former is binding only for those who consent to it, the latter 
can use coercion against those who do not obey its laws. According to Kant, we 
have a duty to join the ethical community, and this assumes the form of a “visible 
church.” Thus, it is the church that provides a way to “insert” morality into the 
world. On this reading, religion, with its institutions, endows the ethical commu-
nity with a public character and so with the state it should create a “tandem.”  
Hasse Hämäläinen’s contribution also deals with ethics; it discusses the cri-
tique of “religious moral teaching” – a teaching outdated and incompatible with 
the modern science – advanced by the 18th-century French philosophes: J.J. Rous-
seau, D. Diderot, J.C. Helvétius, and P.H. Thiry, Baron d’Holbach. In particular, 
Hämäläinen claims that from the works of d’Holbach one can derive a model of 
a non-theistic ethics with materialist underpinnings, which does not imply psy-
chological hedonism, and thereby he undermines the dominant interpretation 
of the French thinker. On this reading, d’Holbach’s moral theory offers a secular 
justification of virtue which becomes grounded in the human striving for self- 
-preservation, rather than in the desire of pleasure. In this light, d’Holbach can be 
considered an advocate of virtuous egoism.  
Returning to Kant, Stephen Palmquist focuses on the Third Piece of Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (which he renders as Religion within the Bounds 
of Bare Reason). On Palmquist’s reading, Kant’s views on the relation between reli-
gion and politics result in the model of a “non-coercive theocracy.” It is a theocra-
cy since the ethical community – which human beings working towards their 
moral improvement have a duty to join – can become real only insofar as it as-
sumes the form of a church (or a religious organization). It is non-coercive since, 
by definition, morality cannot be externally imposed. In this way, Kant’s model of 
theocracy differs from the historical forms of theocracy, such as the ancient Jewish 
state. Moreover, by comparing the church to a family, whose members are bound 
together by the law of love and thus treat one another as equals, Kant sketches 
a picture of an ethical community which, unlike a political community, has the 
potential to realize the good on earth.  
Aaron Szymkowiak contributes an analysis of the views of David Hume on 
religion who, despite enjoying a reputation of an atheist and critic of religion, 
supported the policy of church establishment. One of the explanations of Hume’s 
surprising position is that he perceived the established church as a means of con-
taining religious fanaticism (enthusiasm). Szymkowiak compares Hume’s position 
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with that of Adam Smith, Hume’s critic. Smith advocates religious liberty as he 
believes that the free “market of sects,” i.e. competition between different denomi-
nations, provides a better means of managing enthusiasm, a development which, 
as Szymkowiak notes, would constitute a stage in the process of the secularization 
of society.  
The article by Geert Van Eekert deals with an issue that is closely linked to 
secularism and the values it promotes – such as the liberty of conscience and reli-
gious toleration – namely, freedom of speech. Featuring early modern conceptions 
of free speech (by J. Locke, B. Spinoza, and J.S. Mill), and especially the Kantian 
account of the public use of reason, Van Eekert draws a distinction between the 
Enlightenment idea of free speech and the contemporary individualistic idea of 
free self-expression. The crucial difference between them consists in the fact that 
whereas the early modern and Enlightenment accounts construed free speech as 
a means to develop or defend a common good or value, e.g. truth, safety, justice, 
peace, democracy, etc., nowadays the aim of free speech is to enable an individual 
to be “fully oneself.” Thus, it seems that we have departed from Kant’s under-
standing of freedom of thought as grounded in the recognition that reason consti-
tutes the “touchstone of truth” – insofar as it allows that its tenets be reflected up-
on and criticized, which, according to Van Eekert, should engage a community of 
rational individuals.11 
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